Capital punishment is appropriate for other offences other than murder because this supports the concept of proportionality review of crimes. This is because not all charges can be equated to murder prompting the need for evaluation. For instance, In the 1977 ‘Coker v. Georgia’ case, the jury sentenced Anthony Coker to death for raping Elnita Caver at knife point, in addition to other capital felonies under Georgia’s jurisdiction, which included murder, rape and kidnapping (Mandery, 2005). Hence, by virtue of the other charges, the sentence served its moral function. This led to the establishment of the doctrine of proportionality review for defendants sentenced to death and was later ruled unconstitutional to impose death penalty for adult rapists (Mandery, 2005). This took into account single felonies committed, which do not warrant capital punishment.
The decision to impose capital punishment is essentially based on the grounds of morality. The foundations of morals emerge from the concept of ethical correctness of actions; hence, commissioning capital punishment for a charge of murder serves solve the resulting moral dilemma occasioned by the fact that citizens ought to be answerable for their actions. Individuals who constantly remain in the lower zones on morality experience developmental integrity issues (Manning & Curtis, 2005). Therefore, the rationale for moral assessment focuses on prediction individual character and exhibited actions.
After investigation, the nature and type of offense leads to the establishment of a counterbalance that directly determines the degree of punishment. This is because the punishment deliberation ordinarily includes evidence based on the offenders background, character, and initial circumstances leading to the offense, all which may attract death penalty (Price, Polk, & Beckley, 2009). This ultimately introduces significant challenges in some situations. For instance, for a convicted defendant who raped and murdered a child, this would automatically attract death penalty.