Table of Contents
Introduction
Iran’s nuclear program aims to product uranium for peaceful means. In spite of great controversy of the program, it is supported by many states including Russia, China, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, India, etc. Although the bipolar world is giving way to a multipolar one, it is clear that the US still retains its economic, scientific and technological ascendancy.For many countries, nuclear weapons means security defined as attempts to resolve conflicts that might endanger peace, and defense as any deterrent or retaliatory action by countries to secure their territorial integrity and protect their vital interests. Yet, it would, of course, be overly simplistic to claim that defense begins when security has failed. Defensive tasks typically take place concurrently with security, such as the building of air-defense infrastructures, pre-positioning of forces and the maintenance of nuclear power. It is unhelpful and contentious to compose an exhaustive list of the elements that go to make up security, as they will vary with circumstances (Gold, 2009).
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Supporters of Iran
It is possible to say that these countries would not cooperate with the rest of the world because of political and religious differences. The Asian countries consider the USA and NATO as the main enemies of their independence so they try to acquire nuclear weapons as protection tool against unlawful invasion. The disappearance of a massive unidirectional threat has refocused European minds on the appearance of less precise or predictable risks with potential for escalation and spillover. Consequently, the definition of international nuclear security is broadening after having a very narrow focus during the period of the Cold War. The term, 'security', being so widely and literally interpreted, deserves some clarification. Post-Communist Moscow's virulent diplomatic drive is seen in these countries as reconfirmation of this unabated Russian ambition. Western opponents of NATO's enlargement form two camps. One insists that the benefits are outweighed by the severity of tensions it introduces and exacerbates in relations with Russia. This view maintains that it is an unnecessary provocation of an understandably worried Russia beset by weakness. The other group argues that even limiting admission to the three Central European states makes the alliance too unwieldy, too diluted. The strategic environment will be both politically violent and unstable. Thus, the strategic environment remains the most crucial and salient factor affecting the decision to acquire nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons by nation-states still living in a state of nature despite the hopeful atmosphere generated by the end of the Cold War (Evans and Corsi, 2009).
Arms Control
With respect to arms control, the reduction in the nuclear stockpiles of the US and Russia under the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties will be adhered to with increasing difficulty. These agreements will be subject to agreed breakouts, rather like the elastic interpretation attached to the implementation of the reductions of conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) by the former Soviet Union. US—Russian relations are likely to be under considerable stress and strain, with NATO—Europe still denying membership to Russia but moving towards integrating the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) into its structures. The growing tendency to acquire WMD and ballistic missiles appears to reflect a number of complex and contradictory motivations which nation-states confront when deciding to promote their national interests (Evans and Corsi, 2009). Two well-established motivations appear to predominate: military or strategic ambitions and meta-strategic power play. The former depends upon perceived threats to specific national interests or goals and the latter is derived in part from the prestige which nuclear weapons in particular have historically bestowed upon their possessors. Given the assumption that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction will spread to more nations over the next 20 years or so, what risks are likely to arise with respect to NATO—Europe and its closest Put simply: the risk of nuclear blackmail by Third World nuclear powers, or the risks of nuclear fallout from a nuclear attack or exchange among such powers affecting NATO and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) states (Gold, 2009).
The control of nuclear weapons in Iran is exercised by the government; still its leader has a profound impact on the state policies and proliferation of nuclear projects. More crucially perhaps, there is the risk of weapons-grade material falling into the hands of non-state actors, which cannot be entirely ruled out and as a result of which terrorist-type demands could be made against legitimate political entities. This could threaten lives and property on an unacceptable scale. Yet, alliance support for arms control must not obscure its limitations whether it is pursued bilaterally, multilaterally or indeed unilaterally within a formal or informal framework. The traditional objectives of arms control, of course, have been to enhance global and regional stability, to reduce the likelihood of war and to reduce the consequences and costs of war if it occurs. Iraq's pretensions to become a nuclear-capable power, for example, have already twice provoked an external response: first from Israel, and then from the US-led coalition enforcing UN Security Council resolutions. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvested, and therefore, if the international system is to subsist with officially sanctioned nuclear powers enjoying a monopoly, then new ground-rules are necessary to guide their conduct (Slackman 2010).
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A number of crucial issues must be faced. It is clear that the future strategic policy and arms control strategy have to be approached on the basis that we live in a multipolar as well as a multi-nuclear world in which the permanent members of the UNSC — including future members — should have the right to monopolise nuclear weapons as custodians of international security. It is unclear what the nature and extent will be of the contribution to regional collective defense from countries not directly threatened. No one can oblige countries which are not under threat to make more than a symbolic contribution. The nature and extent of such a contribution from these countries will largely be determined on the basis of the national political considerations. This might mean that in some instances a symbolic contribution would be sufficient.